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Toward a Critique of 
Girard's Model of Reading 
Francesco Garritano 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the contemporary debate on hermeneutics, one of the 
liveliest arguments regards the will to understand, the inter-
preter's sensitivity to come to the text intending to listen to what 
it says. "Willingness to understand" not only is an assumption of 
hermeneutics as a technical discipline, but also, according to 
Gadamer, 1 regulates all of social life, so that understanding is the 
initial moment of any collective practice. In this willing-
ness-which entails laying aside assumptions and their verifica-
tion-are found the beginnings of common sense, of history . 
Contact between the present and the past, the reception and 
enrichment of tradition, occurs with the acceptance of and open-
ing up toward the other, all of which takes the form of a prolonga-
tion and propagation of the diastasis. Gadamer has always held 
fast to these ideas and defended them forcefully whenever ques-
tioned, as in his encounter with Derrida in Paris in April 1981. 
[Translated from the Italian by Michael Rocke] 
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Derrida hypothesized that the Gadamerian "willingness to 
understand" as the preliminary moment of interpretation and of 
the relationship with truth, corresponds to the will to consensus, 
and therefore to a dialectic and metaphysical will. 2 In short, 
Derrida maintains that willingness coincides with intentionality, 
with the result that the other is absorbed by the conscience, in 
accordance with the typical procedures of dialectics. The third is 
thus reduced to the duality on which metaphysics is constructed, 
so that the other is the other of oneself. This is where Derrida 
places understanding, whose decisive moment in his opinion is 
not contact but interruption. This phenomenon is easily seen in 
psychoanalytic hermeneutics, where understanding presupposes 
a change of code, or rather, the translation of the text and its inser-
tion into a different contextual scene. 3 The doubts Derrida raises 
about the hermeneutic tradition from Heidegger to Gadamer are 
serious, and culminate in this question: 
Whether one speaks of consensus or of misunderstanding 
(Schleiermacher), we wonder if the condition of Verstehen, rather 
than a continuum of the relationship, as was said last evening, may 
not in fact be the interruption of the relationship, a certain relation-
ship of interruption, the suspension of any mediation whatsoever? 4 
With these words Derrida formulated a solid attack on hermeneu-
tics as an attempt to deconstruct metaphysics, to think about the 
essence of being, an attack to which Gadamer later responded. 5 
While it is true that in arguing that the will to understand is inten-
tionality, Derrida reiterates his belief that hermeneutics, both 
Heideggerian and Gadamerian, follows the metaphysical tradi-
tion, it is also true that, in the end, what he claims-that under-
standing is understanding of the self and not of the other-is 
confirmed in reality. Here we would like to dwell precisely on a 
case of the suspension of understanding. 
2. HISTORY AND TRUTH 
In 1964 Rene Girard published an essay on Camus, "Pour un 
nouveau proces de L'Etranger,"6 in which he exemplarily commits 
the gesture of interrupting the mediation which Derrida high-
lighted. What happens in this essay? Girard performs a reading 
of Camus's text in which he places the idea of the absurd within 
the framework of underground logic, of the triangular desire he 
speaks about in Mensonge romantique et desir romanesque and in 
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Dostoevski du double a I' unite.7 According to Girard, Camus used 
The Stranger to mask his desire for success, for approval from the 
public opinion he condemned as incapable of being just. 8 As is 
well known, Girard regards triangular desire as a consequence of 
nihilism, of the death of God, in the sense that the loss of unity 
unleashes a struggle to occupy the empty place, a contest that 
grows among men and leads to idolatry . This is explicit in the 
two texts mentioned above, works in which Girard emphasizes 
the need to overcome metaphysical desire (that which tries to sub-
stitute for God), something which occurs in the novel, a place of 
reconciliation. 9 Girard's discourse highlights the loss of values 
(what he designates as nihilism) and the need to put this event 
behind us, that is, the urgency of rebuilding harmony to put an 
end to underground logic . 
Girard applies this model to Camus without too much con-
cern since he clearly sees the connection between the death of 
God and metaphysical desire, and therefore believes he can speak 
of "nihilist individualism." 10 In reality, however, the con-sequen-
tialness between the eclipse of the center and desire is not, as 
Girard would like, marked by God's death but by his presence: to 
deny God means in any case to acknowledge him, so to assert his 
presence does not correspond to the gesture of rejecting nihilism. 
In short, Girard does not thoroughly explore the problem of 
nihilism, but merely accepts the perspective handed down from 
metaphysics-that is, the opposition being-nothingness-without 
dwelling on the possibility of their connection. With these 
assumptions Girard fails to grasp the two central themes of 
Camus's query (responsibility and justice), and instead simply 
finds a replacement for them: the death of the divinity implies the 
triumph of the human, with the result that grace (Girard's harmo-
nizing element) yields to the will to dominate, to man's pretext of 
being just. In other words the absurd-as separation, liberty, and 
responsibility-is grace. Girard forgets what, according to Sartre, 
is Camus's problem par excellence: ethics. 11 
All this finds its justification in that Girard does not contem-
plate entity in proximity to being-in other words, he does not 
evaluate the truth of the latter: oblivion. While Camus proceeds 
from the eternal's decreasing luminosity, from the disappearance 
of harmonizing unity, and confronts the question of man's respon-
sibility, of destiny as depresentation of the quotidian, Girard 
remains with the idea that being is entity. This perspective cannot 
but lead him to consider the Camusian revolt and the query about 
/ 
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ethics as a false problem: justice is the human pretext of substitut-
ing man for God as the origin of grace, and justice returns to grace 
after having passed through the state of underground logic . This 
point of view guides his interpretation of Camus, so that one 
arrives at understanding not in the mediation between text and 
reader, but in the affirmation of the present. Thus the exaspera-
tion of Girard's vision is verified by virtue of the fact that his 
action is accompanied by presence, by a being that surrenders 
itself completel y and consequently has no need to re-present itself 
in order to be affirmed. Girard refuses to verify his preconceived 
idea, with the inevitable consequence that his interpretation of 
The Stranger acquires everything specific to ideological discourse. 
In short, Girard regards the truth as already given, an emanation 
of the divinity present even when underground logic prevails. 
The effect of this concept is the end of history, the occurrence 
of truth in every human action . It appears that Girard actually 
declares the separation of truth and history: to ensure that its his-
torical manifestations do not constitute revelatory moments, truth 
is taken to be (to use Pareyson's expression) but the repetition of 
the identical truth, that is, the repetition of the same. Girard dis-
regards the multiple character of truth, the oblivion from which it 
is led onto the historical scene . In this way, history loses its char-
acter as "access-way to truth," 12 as a dialogue between past and 
present and the revisitation of both, while events in their diversity 
are illuminated by a fullness, by an unalterable truth . The arbi-
trariness of Girard' s interpretation is thus justified and justifiable 
according to the perspective of classical metaphysics: being is, 
and the bias that the interpreter rigorously defends is the primacy 
of this truth. It is opportune to dwell on this disregard for the his-
torical character of truth . Truth cannot be an object that grows or 
diminishes but, on the contrary, remains immobile even when, on 
the level of events, there seem to be variations. 
To return to Camus and Girard, the former regards truth as 
the depresentat ion of the present, while the latter rejects this point 
of view. The interpreter (Girard) resolves the tension according to 
the dynamics of triangular desire, a nihilism that keeps the truth 
very much alive. We are thus in the realm of the dialectical tradi-
tion, of pre-fi xed synthesis, and so no ontic contradiction 
impugns being as presence. Continuing on the level of conse-
quentiality, Girard' s lack of understanding arises with regard to 
the ethical problem in Camus. If truth is fulfilled and puts an end 
to becoming, morality cannot change, in the sense that it is not 
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subject to reformulation. To accept the reappearance of truth 
would be to call being into question, to regard it as immersed in 
destiny. It is just this peremptory refusal that renders vain the 
interrogation on justice, since one can speak of justice only in 
doubt, in the distance between entity and being. 
In Girard' s case, freedom-posited in terms of understand-
ing the true and the good (as Camus understands it)-has no rea-
son to exist: freedom is the other side of grace. Man, therefore, 
does not have to interpret the true, since truth is, regardless of its 
presentation. This perspective arrives at a paradox: an individu-
al's action is justified and he is free of responsibility since his 
action conforms to a previous and unchangeable design. This can 
be seen in the pages of Dostoevski du double a l'unite, at the point 
where Girard comments on the legend of the Grand Inquisitor. 13 
The Inquisitor does not want Christ to reappear, and thus wants 
man to persist in the truth, in a completed history free of revela-
tions. If man is not turned away from the presence and from 
grace, the Inquisitor, inasmuch as he is the guarantee of and wit-
ness to the coming of the truth, will find himself faced with the 
event he tried to cancel: the return of truth. Girard realizes that 
the death of God might correspond not to his disappearance but 
to his appearance, or better, to his reappearance; he considers this 
possibility, but immediately consigns it once again to the silence 
of certainty. In fact, Girard traces for the Inquisitor the typical 
course of whoever harbors doubts about the divinity: the descent 
into hell, the fall into the underground, a place of no doubts, but 
of certainties: 
If the world flees Christ instead of following him, He will make 
this flight serve his plan of redemption. He will do in division and 
contradiction what he wanted to do in union and in joy. In seeking 
to become divine without Christ, man puts himself on the cross. It 
is the freedom of Christ, deflected but alive, that generates the 
underground. 14 
As can be seen, negation is the confirmation of the presence in its 
immutability. 
If we consider what Girard says about the triangular struc-
ture of desire, we see that the central moment is the acknowledg-
ment of desire as the expression of nothingness. All this 
generates idolatry to the extent that it requires the overcoming of 
this state, that is, reconciliation. We have here an absolutely 
dialectical articulation, marked by the resolution of conflict 
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according to a procedure regulated by negativity. In fact it is 
death that harmonizes, that puts an end to tensions; it is in death 
that Girard finds the presence of grace. We can discover what we 
have been talk ing about in the explicit of Mensonge romantique et 
desir romanesque, a comment on the verses of the Gospel of John 
used by Dostoevski as the epigraph to The Brothers Karamazov: 
"Verily, verily I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the 
ground and die , it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth 
much fruit." We believe that the pages in which Girard comments 
on these words are the core of his thought, where we see the pri-
macy of unity, of being, quite far from oblivion. This vision 
springs from an analysis of the world of novels, a reflection that 
embraces authors like Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Dostoevski, 
Proust. Girard finds in a certain type of novel what becomes a 
sort of universal, whose value transcends the present and 
acquires unlimited significance. 
To verify what we have said, let us dwell on the opening of 
"Pour un nouv eau proces de L'Etranger." 
Girard does not bother to prepare himself for Camus's text. 
He does not accept, as Gadamer would say,15 the demands of tra-
dition as the origin of dialogue, but unhesitatingly sets the limits 
within which the text must move. What are these limits? The 
first and most apparent consists of making the character of 
Mersault express the emotions that rouse all men : "love, hate, 
ambition, greed , jealousy." 16 When he identifies Mersault with 
emotion, Girard takes the first and definitive step toward setting 
him up within his model of the modern novel. Indeed, when 
Mersault expresses a desire (which for Girard corresponds to 
Camus's desire for success), The Stranger is inscribed in the 
schema of triangular desire and the absurd becomes the opposite 
of grace . As Girard says: 
The character of Mersault frames the nihilistic individualism 
exposed in The Myth of Sisyphus which is generally designated by 
the word "absurd." Mersault is possessed by the absurd like some 
people, in another spiritual context, are possessed by grace. 17 
If it is kept in mind that we are at the incipit of the essay ded-
icated to The Stranger, it is easily seen that Girard's intentions are 
not to understand the text. Indeed he commits an act of misun-
derstanding, whose object is not so much The Stranger but rather 
The Myth of Sisyphus. What does Girard do? He merely places the 
absurd and mercy in a reflective relationship, or rather he estab-
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lishes a connection between openness and divinity: in other 
words, he is true to the idea that the present is, that the truth is 
expressed in it. The fusion of horizons as the initial moment of 
understanding is lost, thus confirming the Derridian thesis dis-
cussed above, according to which this phenomenon, interpreta-
tion as the suspension of tradition, is typical of psychoanalytical 
interpretation. 18 In "Pour un nouveau proces de L'Etranger," 
Girard merely demystifies the underground plan of Camus's dis-
course on the absurd, and at the same time reinforces his own 
bias, in the sense that he confirms his own convictions, his own 
discourse. 
3. ETHICS OF ACTION 
If one looks closely, Girard' s horizon is structured, as 
Pareyson maintains when he defines ideological discourse, on a 
finite temporality, not subject to diastasis: the two polarities fixed 
by Girard (God-metaphysical desire) derive from the same thing, 
so there is no dialectical dynamic that culminates in synthesis. 
There is no movement, since one begins with being only to stay 
with being. It is not by chance that Girard self-confidently applies 
his method to an author like Dostoevski and to an author like 
Camus; indeed, this perfectly demonstrates that his bias tends 
toward atemporality. Paradoxically, by following Girard's pseu-
do-articulation, one can grasp what Heidegger maintains in his 
"Letter on 'Humanism.'" Responding to Jean Beaufret's question, 
"How can sense be restored to the word 'humanism'?," 
Heidegger notes that in Western thought, man values being 
regardless of its truth. 19 Metaphysics, Heidegger believes, contin-
ues to maintain its dominion even when, as in Sartre's case, one 
claims the precedence of existence over essence 20 : all this leads 
one to not consider the essence of existence, to not see that man 
ex-ists, that he is near to existence. 21 
Now what Girard does not consider is precisely existence as 
man's taking part in the destiny of being (oblivion). This, in our 
opinion, is Girard' s position when he speaks of the absurd and of 
revolt, that is, when he interprets Camus's text. 
The openness of the present, its non-occurrence, is irreconcil-
able with the radicalization of his preconception, a radicalization 
that imposes reflection on essence and existence beginning with 
his non-consideration of the oblivion of being. True to the meta-
physical tradition, therefore, Girard ignores the possibility that 
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the absurd is existence and, without a shadow of doubt, fixes the 
presence of truth in human action, assimilating Camus's thought 
to Sartre's existentialism. It is understandable that Girard effects 
this translation of Camus's thought, inasmuch as he persists in it. 
Identifying the absurd with metaphysical desire, he feels the need 
to defend history or, better, his idea of history, to which he ideo-
logically attributes the value of truth. From this it results that the 
position of Camus, for whom history is expression and revelation, 
must necessarily be rethought, that is, reduced to expression, to a 
present that cannot be altered by appearances. In realizing all 
this, Girard makes Sartre's considerations in "Reponse a Albert 
Camus" his own. With the goal of defending the primacy of exis-
tence, which absorbs essence within itself, Sartre accuses Camus 
of rejecting history in the name of transcendence, 22 that is, of sepa-
ration. In the Sartre-Camus controversy, the latter, who initiated 
the differend with the well-known "Lettre au directeur des Temps 
Modernes," upholds an absolutely specular idea: Sartre's position, 
centered on the priority of existence, celebrates action, and there-
fore the present as the end of history. Camus thus accuses Sartre 
of making action the foundation of history, transforming history 
into ideology, with the result that he forgets that truth is a quest. 23 
Girard, therefore, interprets the absurd on the basis of a 
strange and profitable mixture between the positions of Sartre 
and Camus. He accepts Sartre's idea that Camus is opposed to 
history, sending it off to a preconceived and useful wait. Nothing 
keeps Girard from subscribing to this idea . Nonetheless, after 
having taken Sartre's side he puts himself in a position that clear-
ly reveals his bias and interest: he contemplates the absurd as 
metaphysical desire, as aspiration to centrality, and thus points 
out the correspondence Heidegger observed between the meta-
physical tradition and Sartrian humanism. Put another way, he 
who questions himself about being finds himself in the same posi-
tion as he who denies it in the name of existence. This is not sur-
prising since, as Heidegger teaches, it is impossible to get away 
from metaphysics, although it should be noted here that, in seeing 
grace in the absurd, Girard assimilates Camus's position to 
Sartre's and thus does not take account of their difference. 
Indeed, Girard does not really understand this correspondence, 
but advances it because of the transhistorical character of his 
model of reading. There is nothing surprising in the way Girard 
interprets The Stranger: it is natural that he interprets it in his own 
way. Obviously this penchant means that the interpretation loses 
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its revelatory character, that is, its dimension of listening to being 
in the language. 
I believe Girard was unconcerned about this when he placed 
himself before Camus's text; after all, he proceeds from a truth 
without blemish, from being without destiny. Nonetheless, it is 
opportune to assess the consequences of this interpretive model 
from an ethical point of view, since Girard bases his own dis-
course on and in morality. In Mensonge romantique et desire 
romanesque, Girard reveals the origins of metaphysical desire and 
the underground world, whose logic constitutes the rejection of 
ethics, the refusal to stand face-to-face with the other. In fact the 
overcoming of this state is found in the reconciliation achieved in 
God. It is in the rediscovery of centrality, therefore, that otherness 
is acknowledged. In this regard Girard asserts, "A victory over 
self-love permits us to descend deeply into the ego and with the 
same movement gives us the recognition of the Other." 24 This 
idea of ethics also guides Girard' s thinking in Dostoevski du double 
a l'unite; indeed, in this text it is even more clear, since Girard 
speaks of Dostoevski's sinking into the underground and his con-
sequent rediscovery of the light, of grace. 25 There are no doubts, 
therefore, that Girard considers a certain type of novel as the 
place where the thought of an epoch is made manifest, a type 
marked by the crisis of values, by the loss of moral motivations, 
and by the need to rediscover them. The same coordinates 
emerge in "Pour un nouveau proces de L'Etranger," in which he 
seeks to inscribe Camus's thought in the dynamic described 
above-in the negation-affirmation of God-thereby eliminating 
the possibility that the absurd can be an interrogation on being, 
can be distance. 
At this point, however, there is an event that cannot be 
ignored. When Mersault becomes "the man of Dostoevski's 
underground," 26 we not only have a confirmation of the value of 
Girard's thought, but something else happens that is ethically 
important. Girard declares that access to justice and morality 
through a non-dialectical process is impossible. In fact, the 
absurd is nothing but man's taking responsibility after the pres-
ence-absence of God. Camus is explicit about this in L'homme 
revolte, where he notes that revolt (the absurd) has not found an 
application in history except in terms of deviation: revolt is 
inevitably linked to the State-that is, it is transformed into revo-
lution, into centrality, and thus fails in responsibility. According 
to Camus the absurd, as separation from and depresentation of 
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the present, demands that the subject can no longer take refuge in 
God, that man cannot be invested and helped by his presence. 
The openness of being defines responsibility, since it keeps the 
subject from proceeding intentionally, that is, from acting in the 
name of God according to a design legitimated even in injustice. 
Yet Girard seems to deny there is responsibility in separation, in 
the oblivion of being, in a subject as I-for-other, to use Levinas's 
expression. 
This position seems to contradict the foundation of ethics. In 
short, there is a paradox, for in the name of the other Girard eras-
es otherness; in the name of a thought protected from the time-
lessness of ideology, he brings everything back to sameness. Even 
more peculiarly, the supposed dialectical movement is not really 
such: he establishes an interpretive model and applies it inex-
orably to different texts, which he never listens to but simply 
translates and reduces. The tension that marks dialectical thought 
is missing, since Girard does not limit himself to establishing his 
own position, but also defines the antithetical position and, of 
course, their unification. That Girard radicalizes history as pre-
sent and event can be seen in his defense of the quotidian. He 
seeks to defend public opinion and, more precisely, its values, 
from the doubts of a moral nature raised by Camus. According to 
Girard, Camus claims the arbitrariness of values, therefore value 
as desire for power; nonetheless, his discourse is unable to escape 
this logic and he seeks to disguise it with the problem of justice.27 
Continuing on this path, Girard runs up against the question of 
"authentic existence," and of course he can only reject the hypoth-
esis that the quotidian is the occurrence of the possibility of 
impossibility and its re-presentation. 28 Finiteness cannot, there-
fore, call into discussion the advent of the present, whose tempo-
ral narrowness is led toward the timelessness of being, in the 
sense that the present partakes of the infinity of negation. All this 
develops in Girard' s discourse under the guise of a defense of 
current values and the preconceptions of his public. 
On the basis of what we have said, Girard's reading of The 
Stranger constitutes a sort of celebration of bias, with the result 
that tradition is received in terms of interruption. The fusion of 
horizons occurs, then, as a radicalization and ahistoricity of the 
present, which, as truth, rejects dialogue with tradition. This 
seems to support the idea of discontinuity in hermeneutical prac-
tice, a possibility which, as has been noted, Girard did not con-
template: in fact, the foundation of the present is in a being that 
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is, with the result that bias is truth. In this way an ethics of action 
is affirmed in which the other, paradoxically, is not acknowledged 
in history or daily life, but in synthesis-that is, outside history. 
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